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1. INTRODUCTION 5
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent events in Argentina and Turkey provide evidence that the
stability of world economies is getting more and more fragile. Con-
temporary in-depth positive analysis of crises sources and mecha-
nisms is now paralleling efforts to formulate the new principles of the
international financial system.
We discuss below an effect that may play an important role in the de-
velopment of the most severe crises. This effect may appear in situa-
tions where the capital market is dominated by a few large players
and the government is lacking liquidity to withstand temporary dete-
rioration of the external environment or a speculative attack.
The key point of the effect is the government's possibility to share the
burden of fighting the crisis hazard with the private sector. This may
be possible as creditors who are holding government assets or assets
denominated in the national currency have additional incentives to
prevent a crisis. The government can use these assets as 'hostages,'
making investors support its fight against the crisis. In a sense this is
a model of the possible cooperation between the government and pri-
vate sector in mitigating the financial crisis. But as the government
forces investors to bail it out, the effect under consideration may be
important only in the most severe crisis cases.
The 'hostage effect' incorporates the problem of coordination, as do
most second-generation models. But it is demonstrated that the logic
of coordination is reversed here. Standard models imply that sup-
porting the status quo becomes more attractive for an investor if
other participants also decide to support the status quo. When the
government makes use of the 'hostage effect', increased (for some
reasons) efforts by some investor to support the status quo lead to
lower efforts by other participants. As a consequence, standard ap-
proaches to curing crises may produce results opposite to that pre-
dicted by common sense.
We argue that some of the effects revealed by our model could con-
tribute to the development of the financial crisis in Russia in 1998.
This concerns first of all the apparently adverse impact of loans pro-
vided by the IMF and the World Bank. Contrary to the standard think-
ing, their support not only failed to relieve the crisis, but rather pre-
cipitated the collapse, which occurred almost immediately after
receiving these loans.
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2. CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The disputes on the nature and specifics of the Russian crisis of 1998
have mainly abated, and a comprehensive analysis of the crisis develop-
ment has been published (see for instance Kharas, Pinto, and Ulatov,
2001), but still fully convincing answers to many key questions are miss-
ing. Views on the origins of the Russian crisis vary widely. Some analysts
(for example, Alexashenko, 1999) argue that Russia has experienced
mainly a debt crisis, which developed as a result of the soft fiscal policy
carried out by the government. It is often asserted that the GKO market
was, in fact, a Ponzi scheme, and its collapse was initially inevitable and
only slightly precipitated by the Asian crisis. According to this view, the
debt crisis aroused a currency crisis, which otherwise would not have
occurred, as the Central Bank (CBR) implemented tight monetary policy.
The opposite view (presented for instance by Montes and Popov, 1990)
is that Russia experienced a currency crisis caused by strongly distorted
targets of the exchange rate policy (significantly overvalued ruble), while
the debt crisis was not inevitable and happened due to the erroneous
measures of the authorities. Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) and Perotti
(2001) stress soft budget and legal constraints as a fundamental source
of the crisis. We argue that the explanation of both its origin and course
is more complicated, involving several components.
We consider the same general factors as other authors, yet our conclu-
sions differ somewhat from the common views. One of our main points is
to show that when discussing the Russian crisis, one should make a
thorough distinction between the situation before and after the com-
mencement of the crisis. Assertions about the sustainability of macro-
economic policy, which are often made without exact specification of
timing and time horizon, mislead rather than explain the crisis causes.
Before turning to our analysis, let us look at the economic developments
on the eve of the crisis. The government bond (GKO/OFZ) yields were
rapidly falling in 1997. Yields for 6-month GKO's dropped from 45% in
December 1996, down to 16–17% in July–October 1997. Ex-post real
rates fell to only 8% in the Q3 1997. This decline was to a great extent
explained by the participation of non-resident investors. Gurvich and
Dvorkovich (1999) estimate the contribution of the integration of the
GKO market into international capital markets as 2/3 of the total ob-
served decline.
Lower interest rates resulted in some slowing down of the debt stock: its
growth amounted to 84% in 1997, as compared to 209% in 1996. Do-
mestic debt of the federal government increased in 1997 by 3 percent-
age points of GDP, as compared to 5 percentage points in 1996, though
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borrowing by the government still remained quite substantial: total
GKO/OFZ's placement was equivalent in 1997, as in 1996, to 20% of the
GDP. The duration of domestic debt was gradually growing, although still
remaining quite short, not exceeding 1 year. This fact determined the
enormous size of the current debt redemption due: GKO/OFZ's redemp-
tion due in 1998 was over 1.5 times higher than the current revenues of
the Federal budget, this being one of the key causes of debt crisis.
At the same time the transformation recession ceased and production
recovery began. The growth rate was relatively high during this period,
amounting in Q2–Q4 1997 to some 4% in annual terms. In other words,
investors' confidence, fuelled with expectations of a forthcoming recov-
ery, was increasing during this period despite the remaining imbalanced
fiscal policy of the government.
We agree with Trofimov (1999) that the GKO market should not be
viewed as a Ponzi scheme at that time. A simple analysis of debt
sustainability reveals that substantial, but quite feasible modifications in
the fiscal policy were needed to stabilize the debt ratio to GDP (which
was not too large at that moment). Hence debt policy was not sustain-
able in the long run, but could be made sustainable by moderate
amendments. At the same time, falling interest rates prove that it was
viewed as sustainable in the short run by investors.
A salient feature of the Russian GKO/OFZ market was the domination of
large players. As pointed out by Medvedev and Kolodyazhny (2000), the
leading role in the market was played by a limited number of dealers and
non-residents. The government accounted for this fact in the course of
the crisis by trying to discuss measures to prevent failure with major in-
vestors.
The next important question is: was ruble overvalued? First of all, UN es-
timates of the relationship between exchange rates and PPP provide evi-
dence that this ratio for the ruble (43%) was roughly equal in 1996 to
that for the Czech (43%) and Slovak (40%) currencies, and was lower
than that for the Hungarian (48%), and Polish (51%) currencies. Hence,
according to these estimates the ruble was not overvalued in comparison
with the currencies of other transition economies. The same conclusion
can be obtained from a comparison of the wages in these economies in
dollar terms. Similar conclusions can be derived from the main test of
'exchange rate appropriateness': the sustainability of the balance of
payments. On the one hand, Russia's balance of payments was sup-
ported by a large-scale inflow of short-term capital: in 1997 new invest-
ment to GKO's amounted to $11 billion, external borrowing by the gov-
ernment made up another $11 billion, inflows to the private sector turned
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to be $24 billion, of which direct foreign investment accounted for only
$6 billion. Thus the capital inflow totaled $45 billion, with almost 2/3 fal-
ling on short-term investment, and we admit that such huge inflows ex-
ceeded by far their normal level. But, on the other hand, it should not be
forgotten that capital outflow from Russia (in the most broad sense, as
the increase in foreign assets of the private sector) was almost as large,
reaching $40 billion in 1997. Besides, capital inflows and outflows were
highly correlated during the period under consideration, i.e., the former
were often used as a source for the latter.
According to our analysis, real exchange rate sustainable in the medium
term equals about 80% of its pre-crisis level. In other words, the exchange
rate was overvalued, but not so much: reaching a sustained exchange rate
required real depreciation by only 25% instead of 100%, as it actually oc-
curred in the H2 1998. Surely, capital outflow would hardly reverse as fast
as short-term investments; still this proves that in the medium term only
moderate modification of the exchange rate policy was required.
This situation was broken abruptly in late 1997, when the world com-
modity prices dropped. As a result export value fell by $15 billion in
1998, though its volume slightly increased. Sharp deterioration of the
BOP made the then effective exchange rate no longer sustainable even
in the short run, and nobody could know how greatly this situation would
deteriorate in terms of trade, and how long it would last. The monetary
authorities had two options: to abandon the 'crawling peg' exchange rate
regime and switch to a floating exchange rate policy, or to defend ruble.
The Central Bank and the government chose the latter option.
It is clear that success in defending the ruble depended critically on the
duration of the crisis: the actual rate could be maintained only in the very
short run. Hence the actual policy choice made implied quite optimistic
expectations of a rapid recovery of commodity prices. Throughout the
crisis period, authorities were arguing that prices would recover in some
3 or 4 months, and their actions were based on this presumption. The
major measures included:
• replacing short-term domestic borrowing with long-term external
borrowing,
• swapping of the GKO/OFZ's debt falling due in 1998–1999 (worth 27
billion rubles, or the equivalent of around one month of redemption
due) for long-term eurobonds (worth $5.9 billion),
• requesting an urgent IMF loan,
• reducing domestic borrowing (net domestic financing had been
negative since March 1998) by cutting spending at the cost of build-
ing up arrears in the budget.
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Major measures by the government amounted to efforts to cut short-
term need in liquidity and to obtain additional liquidity to survive the tran-
sient (as it was assumed) period of unfavorable external conditions.
The elaboration of the Fiscal Consolidation Program was a more funda-
mental policy measure, but it faced difficulties in passing the Duma and
as a result was not implemented.
A combination of all these circumstances resulted in the development of
two parallel, very fast and closely interrelated processes:
• Increased demand for hard currency,
• Falling demand for ruble-denominated government debt. Average
GKO yields hiked to 37% in December 1997, 24% in March 1998,
55% in May 1998, and 81% in July 1998.
The underlying mechanism, as we see it, was the following.
• Expected depreciation raised GKO interest rates via the 'interest
parity ratio'. It is important to draw attention to the fact that while
yields for 6-month GKO's hiked from 16–17% in the Q3 1997 to 31–
32% in the H1 1998, yields for comparable MinFin bonds increased
relatively slightly: from 8–9% to 9–12%. It should be noted that de-
spite the commonly held view, the change in investors sentiments to-
wards emerging markets had nothing to do with the lower de-
mand for GKO's, as the share of non-residents in the GKO/OFZ
market (as well as non-resident's holdings in dollar terms) was grow-
ing during the crisis.
• Borrowing at such rates evidently made fiscal policy unsustainable,
hence the government made efforts to cut domestic financing as
noted above. Domestic public debt has increased in the first half of
1998 by only 16%.
• Free money was directed then to the currency market, depleting the
Central Bank's international reserves (the latter fell from $23 bil-
lion in the end of October 1997 to $15 billion in the end of March
1998),
• The Central Bank, trying to defend the ruble from devaluation, used
to raise refinancing rate,
• High interest rates in the money market relaxed pressure on the ruble
for a while, but, on the other hand, they supported high interest rates
on GKO's market, and suppressed production. Industrial output
dropped in 9 months of the crisis period (from October 1997 to July
1998) by 10% on a seasonally adjusted basis.
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It is clear that such a process could be sustained for only a very short
time, and the outcome depended on how long the period of low com-
modity prices may last. This was a gamble: monetary authorities bet that
prices will start recovering before reserves are depleted. And if this had
really occurred a year earlier than it happened, the crisis could well have
been evaded in the short term, and perhaps it would make the govern-
ment modify its policy and thus evade the crisis in the long run as well.
Summarizing, we can conclude that the macroeconomic policy pursued
by the monetary authorities was not robust in the medium run, but, in the
absence of external shocks, it was far from a crisis area, and required
moderate, feasible modifications to be viable. The impetus to the crisis
was given by a sharp deterioration in terms of trade. After this shock the
previously pursued policy was no more sustainable in the short run and
required drastic changes. First of all, switching to a floating exchange
rate was urgently needed. The authorities underestimated the scale of
deterioration in the fundamentals, and failed to make adequate adjust-
ments to the policy. They assumed that 'bad times' would finish shortly,
and addressed the situation as a transient liquidity crisis. As optimistic
expectations did not realize, the crisis became inevitable. The debt mar-
ket was not the source of the crisis, but was the weakest, most vulner-
able element hit by the crisis. The fundamental cause of the immense
yields on the GKO market was the expectation of devaluation, not dis-
trust of the Russian government's debt or of emerging market securities
in general.
After the crisis, the government had to make fundamental modifications
in its macroeconomic policy, but this does not prove by itself that the
previous policy was doomed to fail. The course of events only confirmed
the necessity to react adequately to serious changes in the fundamen-
tals.
The following salient features of the Russian financial crisis underpin
parallels with the model presented below.
• The crisis was ignited by unexpected external shock,
• Prevalence of short-term domestic debt made the government de-
pendent on the investors' decision to roll-over the debt, as debt re-
demption due exceeded by far the current fiscal revenues,
• The debt and currency crises developed in parallel, as investors
mainly moved resources between these two markets.
• The monetary authorities viewed the problem primarily as a lack of li-
quidity, and correspondingly addressed it mainly by trying to get ad-
ditional external financing (to increase both the foreign currency re-
serves and the fiscal reserves).
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• Another important way of fighting the crisis was raising interest rates
to make ruble assets more attractive.
• The GKO/OFZ market was dominated by large players.
• Failure to prevent the crisis resulted in substantial losses borne by
GKO/OFZ holders. Their total losses (taking into account both the
change in face value and in real value as a result of inflation and de-
preciation) are estimated as almost 90%.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many aspects of the problems addressed in this paper are related to
those considered in other publications on crises modeling.
Many authors discuss the problem of defending an exchange rate
from attack by raising interest rates. Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) in-
corporated into the model of exchange rate crisis costs of raising in-
terest rates (due to the increase in public debt, negative impact on
economic activity, weakening of the banking system, etc.). They
found that awareness of these costs by speculators may generate a
self-fulfilling crisis and provided informal evidence that that their
model can explain some features of the 1992–1993 EMS crisis. Lahiri
and Vegh (2000) demonstrated that it is feasible to delay a BOP crisis
by raising interest rates, but this policy has intrinsic limitations. Rais-
ing rates above a certain level may actually hasten the crisis. In addi-
tion they prove that there is an area where monetary authorities can
use interest rates to prevent a crisis, but the costs outweigh the
gains. Flood and Jeanne (2000) come to the conclusion that raising
interest rates makes domestic assets more attractive but weakens the
domestic currency by increasing the government's fiscal liabilities. As
a result, a speculation attack motivated by underlying fiscal fragility
may be hastened by raising interest rates.
The next subject addressed in many models is the role of liquidity con-
straints. The key point in this discussion is that low liquidity may lead to a
self-fulfilling crisis because of coordination failure among creditors: the
country will service its debt or default, depending on decisions by inves-
tors to roll over the debt or to refrain from it. Related issues are how to
tell insolvent debtor from illiquid ones, and moral hazards arising from
extending liquidity. Some of the recent results in this field can be sum-
marized as follows. Bussiere and Mulder (1999) find that higher liquidity
can offset weak fundamentals and limit the vulnerability of countries
in the period of contagion. They argue that liquidity is required while
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investors learn whether the debtor hit by the crisis is solvent or not. Em-
pirical analysis carried out by Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) shows
that the probability of a failure in foreign debt service depends signifi-
cantly on external liquidity after controlling for the debt structure and for
macroeconomic variables. Many papers examine reasonable reserve
thresholds. Obstfeld (1986) demonstrated that for a country that can
borrow from international capital markets, foreign reserves can become
infinitely negative without violating the government intertemporal budget
constraint. Disyatat (2001) constructed a second-generation model that
reflects limited borrowing at a cost as well as the macroeconomic costs
of defending the exchange rate. In the framework of this model, a crisis
may occur due to inadequate reserves, and the optimal amount of re-
serves can be estimated.
Many authors (for instance, Feldstein, 1999) argue that liquidity is the
key to self-protecting countries (especially emerging markets) from cri-
ses. In cases when a country loses access to capital markets, interna-
tional institutions may play a role of a 'lender of last resort' in preventing
a crisis (Fisher, 1999).
Many papers investigate the possible role of large players as sources of
market destabilization. Corsetti, Pesetti and Roubini (2001) discuss ana-
lytical results from different models suggesting that the presence of
agents with high market power can increase a country's vulnerability to a
crisis.
Finally, our study has some common features with papers on the role of
soft budget constraints in banking crises (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995;
Mitchell, 1999). These authors also discuss situations where an investor
has strong incentives to bail-out the debtor.
4. CRISIS MODEL
Below we examine a simple model of a crisis. Its main features can be
summarized as follows. A crises occurs, which originates from an unex-
pected external shock (say, contraction of fiscal revenues due to falling
export prices). Authorities, as a result, experience a shortage of liquidity
to support the status quo (keeping the exchange rate regime, or servic-
ing public debt). If we are talking about debt crisis, the origin of a crisis
is the possibility that resources available to the government may fall short
of its commitments, i.e., a fiscal gap may arise. We assume that the
government is unable to fully cover this gap by increasing fiscal revenues
and/or cutting expenditures, and hence considers additional borrowing
to cover the financial gap.
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Both future revenue and the level to which the government is willing and
able to cut its commitments are uncertain. If new investment happens to
be insufficient to honor all payments due, the government has to cover
the gap by printing money, or to reduce commitments by defaulting. The
result is, on the one hand, partial loss in value of the debt held by in-
vestors (debt failure), and on the other hand, losses for the government
(due to an adverse effect on investment and production, undermined
confidence to the monetary authorities, etc.). At the same time our
model also accounts for the positive effect of a crisis for the government
which gains from alleviating the burden of public debt.
It is natural to assume that the degree of losses borne by debt holders
positively depends on the amount of the uncovered fiscal gap. This as-
sumption looks especially plausible, if we are talking about domestic
debt and assume that the most probable way of covering the gap, if the
government resources are insufficient, is printing money. In this case
depreciation of the debt depends on inflation, which depends on the re-
lationship between the initial money supply and additional emission. This,
in turn, implies their negative dependence on the size of new lending to
the government.
The problem is that if the government is under risk, a relatively high yield
should be suggested to attract investment (at least within the standard
logic). The government has to trade off the disadvantages of the crisis
with the costs of fighting it (which include both direct costs of borrowing
and indirect adverse effects of raising interest rates in the economy). In
addition, we should take into account that the crisis has not only ad-
verse, but also some positive effects from the viewpoint of the govern-
ment, as it alleviates debt burden. The first question to be answered by
our study is under what conditions the government has a chance to pay
acceptable costs for reducing the risk of a crisis.
An important point of our study is to account for the fact that not only
the government is interested in evading a crisis, but so are investors
holding debt under risky circumstances. Lending to the government, on
the one hand, increases investor's assets under risk. On the other hand,
lending reduces the possibility of a debt crisis and hence the expected
losses from it for the debt holder. Additional incentives for debt holders
to invest can change the situation critically if the government decides to
incorporate these incentives into its anti-crisis policies.
Normally higher debt increases the risk of not servicing it fully and/or in
time by the government. But in the situation of an acute crisis, additional
borrowing reduces immediate risks of a liquidity crisis. Still it is clear that
the side effect of new borrowing is an increased chance of a debt crisis
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in the long term. On reaching some level, the latter effect becomes
dominating: indeed if the debt stock becomes too large, it is impossible
for the government to pay it off. We assume hence that the rate of loss
is decreasing for not too large amounts of investment, and growing for
larger amounts. The first interval reflects the short-term effects, while the
second one is responsible for the long-term effects.
It is important to note that, generally, the stock of the public debt affects
the size of the government's commitments, and hence, everything else
being fixed, is linked to the size of the fiscal gap. But, on the other hand,
the fiscal gap depends on relations between budget revenues, non-
interest commitments, and debt payments due (including interest pay-
ments and debt redemption). The latter, in turn, depends on the maturity
of the debt. In other words, debt stock is only one of the factors, which
taken together define the amount of the fiscal gap. Being interested in
the analysis of the 'hostage effect', we compare debt crisis outcomes in
situations with different values of debt stock but with the same charac-
teristics of a fiscal gap.
We are dividing decisions concerning new lending into two parts, as-
suming that the government is first choosing the interest rate suggested
to investors, and then the latter are choosing the amount they are willing
to lend at this rate.
The effect of borrowing is ambiguous for both investors and the govern-
ment. Common sense tells us that to attract investment during a crisis,
the government has to suggest a high interest rate, compensating for
the risk of losses. This, first, raises future interest payments, and sec-
ond, has adverse effect on production by suppressing credit available to
the economy. Thus, making decisions about investment, the government
has to compare the lower risk of the crisis with the costs of borrowing
and debt alleviation if the crisis occurs, and investors have to take into
account the positive short-term and negative long-term impacts of lend-
ing in a time of crisis risk, and to compare both with the effect of an in-
creased amount of assets under risk in their portfolios.
Next, we have to formulate criteria for decision-making by the govern-
ment and investors. The natural assumption is that the payoff of the gov-
ernment negatively depends on the interest payments to investors, and
positively depends on the loss of real value of the public debt (as it re-
lieves debt burden). In addition, the government's payoff function should
reflect two indirect effects. The first is debt failure, which has an adverse
impact on the economy. Our assumption is that it is reflected in the gov-
ernment's payoff as a negative function of the rate of losses borne by in-
vestors. Second, raising interest rate hits production and fiscal revenues,
hence the pay-off function negatively depends on the interest rate.
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Our model also has alternative interpretations. First, it can be equally
viewed as a model of a currency crisis. In this case investors decide
whether to invest in the foreign currency to save their cash from depre-
ciation or to support the national currency to evade depreciation of do-
mestic assets which they initially hold.
Another interpretation can be given in terms of project organization the-
ory. Investors decide whether or not to bail-out the project under risk to
save their potential return on their previous investment. Both alternative
interpretations require no modifications of the model.
Now we can give the formal specification of the game. It has N + 1 par-
ticipants (the government and N investors) and is characterized by pa-
rameters di ≥ 0 (government debt held by i-th investor) and r0 (yield for
non-risk investment, an alternative to lending to the government). Im-
portant characteristics of the game also include the following:
• Loss function ω(X), which is falling for all X < H, and growing for
X > H, with ω(X) → 1 as X → ∞,
• Minimal rate of losses ωm = ω(H),
• ϕ(r) — growing with r function, reflecting the adverse impact of raising
interest rate r on the economy,
• Z(ω) — growing function of ω, reflecting the adverse impact of debt
failure on the economy (the larger is the rate of losses ω, the
stronger is this effect).
All functions are assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. In
addition, we assume that ω is concave and its derivative has limited value
in a zero point: ω′(0) ≠ –∞.
The game has 2 stages.
Stage 1. The government chooses yield r suggested to investors or de-
cides not to borrow.
Stage 2. All investors independently choose amounts xi of lending to the
government at the interest rate r. If the government decided in the first
stage not to borrow, it is assumed that xi = 0 for all i, and r = 0.
The payoff function of i-th investor wi is defined as an expected change
in his assets resulting from his and others' actions:
wi({xi}, r) = xi (r – r0) – (di + xi + xi r) ω(X),
where X = Σ xi is the total amount of lending provided by all investors.
The first component reflects additional interest received on lending
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(compared with investing in a risk-free asset), while the second one re-
flects losses from debt failure.
The government's payoff also consists of two parts:
V(X, r) = – [X (r – r0) – (D + X + X r) ω(X)] – [ϕ(r) + Z(ω(X))]
(D being total amount of debt initially held by investors: D = Σ di).
The first part equals the sum of investors' payoffs taken with an inverse
sign (as both interest gains by investors and their losses in the case of
debt failure correspond to equal losses and gains by the government).
The second part reflects the adverse effect ϕ of raising the interest rate
and the adverse effect of a debt failure Z.
Our objective is to identify solutions of this game, to analyze how large
investment can be and what defines its magnitude. The amount of new
investment in this model defines the degree of the crisis and hence can
be viewed as the level of coordination between the government and in-
vestors in preventing a crisis. We shall call the game solution where total
investment is zero 'trivial,' and that with positive total investment 'coop-
erative.'
5. GAME SOLUTION
First, we will prove the existence of the game solution.
Proposition 1. If: 1) portfolios of investors are large enough and not
very different in their sizes, 2) the adverse effect of a crisis is relatively
strong (Z′(ξ) > D for all ξ ∈ [0, 1]), then the game has a single equilib-
rium, which is positive.
Proof. Suppose that interest rate r is fixed. The lending decisions taken
by investors under fixed r can be regarded then as a sub-game. The so-
lution to this sub-game (if one exists) is called positive, if xi > 0 for all i.
The positive equilibrium of the sub-game of N investors with portfolios Di
is a set { ∗ix }, 
∗
ix > 0, that satisfies the following conditions:
{ }
− − ≠

= = =
* * *argmax ( , ), 1, ..., ,
i
i i i i i j j ix
x W X x i N X x .
The pay-off function of the i-th investor can be presented as
ρ ω= −({x },r) ( ) ( )i j i iw x X d X ,
5. GAME SOLUTION 17
where ρ ω= − − +0( ) (1 ) ( ).X r r r X
The first-order condition of the maximization problem has the following
form:
{ ρ ρ ω′ ′ ′= + − = =({x },r) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 1, ...,i j i iw X x X d X i N . (1)
From this system one immediately derives that if ω′(X) ≠ 0,
+ + = + + ∀(1 ) (1 ) , ,i i j jr x d r x d i j .
Using this last equation, the first-order condition can be transformed into
a system of one differential equation and N – 1 algebraic ones. To dem-
onstrate this, let us denote, without loss of generality, { }=1 max id d .
Then the following is just a simple transformation:
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Now the first-order conditions (1) can be rewritten to show that invest-
ment made by participants 2, ..., N are in fact functions of investment x1
chosen by the first participant:
ρ ρ ω′ ′ ′= + + + − + = −
= + > +
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
, 1.
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i
i
w {x } Nx x Nx d Nx
d d
x x i
r
F F F
(2)
To show that the system (1) has a non-zero solution, one has to prove
that the differential equations have such solutions. Suppose that
ω
ω
+
> =
′−
0 ( ), 1, ...,
( )i
r
d i N
F
F
(these conditions specify the assumptions introduced above that portfo-
lios are large enough). An important role here is played by the special
interest rate rH:
rH = (r0 + ωm)/(1 – ωm).
This rate covers possible risks to investors if the rate of losses equals
ωm. Once this is the lowest possible level of losses, rH represents the
cutting point: any yield below rH will not compensate for the investment
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risks and ρ(X) will be negative for any X; while yields above rH may com-
pensate for the risks or not, depending on the decisions of all investors.
Then, as one can easily see, ′iw (0) > 0 for any i and any r. Next,
′iw (X) < 0 whenever X ≥ H for any r < rH. When r > rH, given the proper-
ties of the ω function, there exists such large X that ′iw (X) < 0. Given
that ′iw (X) are continuous, it follows that, if F < X, some point
>* 0ix exists, where 
∗
′ =( ) 0i iw x . It can be easily seen that if interest rate
rH is suggested by the government, any set {xj} such that Σxj = H is a
Nash equilibrium, and no other equilibria exist.
Now we turn to the analysis of the government's choice of interest rate.
The payoff obtained by the government in any of the investors' equilib-
rium at rH equals V(H, rH). The government thus always has the possibil-
ity to attract total investment H, and to ensure payoff V(H, rH).
Next, it can be demonstrated that the government's strategies with r > rH
are dominated by rH. The proof includes two cases: X ≤ H, or X > H. In fact
the former case is impossible, as each participant could gain then from in-
creasing his lending by amount H – X. Indeed, let ∗z = xi + (H – X) be new
investment by i-th participant. Then
wi(
∗z , ∗
−iX , r)– wi(
∗
ix ,
∗
−iX , r) =
= di (ω(X) – ωm) + 
∗
ix (ω(X) – ωm) + (
∗z – ∗ix )[r – r0 – (1 + r)ωm] > 0,
as all components on the right side are positive.
In the case when X > H, the following inequalities hold:
V(rH)–V(r) =
   = Dωm – ϕ(rH) – Z(ωm) +Xρ – Dω(X) + ϕ(r) + Z(ω(X)) =
   = Xρ – D (ω(X) – ωm) + (Z(ω(X)–Z(ωm)) + (ϕ(r) – ϕ(rH)) =
   = ( ′Z (ξ) – D) (ω(X) – ωm) + Xρ +(ϕ(r) – ϕ(rH)) > 0.
Hence values of r > rH could be disregarded.
To show that the equilibrium X* is unique, one has demonstrate that ′′1W
is negative for any ∈ −  0, /y H F N . Together with relations (2) this will
lead to the uniqueness of { }∗
>1
i
i
x  and to the satisfaction of the second
order conditions for the solution of the system (2). The second derivative
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of the pay-off function of the first player has the form:
ρ ρ ω′′ ′′ ′′= + + + − +1 1 1 1 1 1( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( )w X Nx x Nx D NxF F F .
So the equilibrium uniqueness condition has the following form:
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ω
ω
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To complete the proof, one has to show that the conditions of existence
and uniqueness of the maximization problem solution are consistent with
the individual rationality constraints. Consider whether it is profitable for
the i-th investor to abstain from investment when the others invest opti-
mal amounts for the N-player game. In this case, given the properties of
the pay-off functions, one can see that point { }∗
−
,0iX  is on the left of the
solution of system (2). Therefore the pay-off functions at this point are
increasing with respect to xi. So by investing some amount, the i-th
player will become better off. This means that it is not profitable for the
i-th investor to deviate from the equilibrium point. Q.E.D.
One of the basic conditions for the existence of the equilibrium in the
N-player game is the restriction on the differences of portfolio sizes.
What happens when this restriction is broken? Obviously a positive equi-
librium in the N-player game will not exist. On the other hand, this might
be the case when N – 1 players invest non-zero amounts and the other
one withdraws from the game. Is this always possible or not?
Consider the game of N investors with F > H and F–i < H for any i (where
F–i is defined, as above, as the net of the portfolio of the i-th player).
Suppose that all other conditions for any (N – 1)-player sub-game to
have a positive equilibrium hold. This equilibrium will be the one of
the N-player game with the i-th investor staying aside if she will not have
incentives to enter when the others invest optimal amounts for the
(N – 1)-player game. Let { ∗
−ix } be the equilibrium of the (N – 1)-player
game without the i-th investor. Consider the first derivative of the i-th
player's pay-off function at this point.
ρ ω
− −
′ ′= − + − − +* *1 1( ,0 ) (( 1) ) (( 1) )
*
i -i i i iw {x } N x d N xF F
If this derivative will be less than 0, the i-th player will not enter the game
and the equilibrium with N – 1 players investing and the i-th one not will
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exist. This happens if her portfolio is not too large:
ρ
ω
−
−
− +
< −
′ − +
*
1
*
1
(( 1) )
(( 1) )
i
i
i
N x
d
N x
F
F
.
Now, for each interest rate r (0 ≤ r ≤ rH) chosen by the government, its
payoff V*(r) is defined. Limited function V*(r) reaches its maximum on
[0, H]. To conclude, it should be noted that the option 'not to borrow' is
inferior for the government as compared with suggesting a zero interest
rate.
This completes the proof that the game has a unique positive equilib-
rium. We turn now to the analysis of this equilibrium. Its nature can be
seen from the following discussion.
First, if assumptions of Proposition 1 hold, the government always sug-
gests an interest rate below rH. This follows from the fact that ′rV (rH) =
= –H(1 – ωm) – ϕ′(rH) < 0. In other words, the optimal policy of the gov-
ernment always involves suggesting an interest rate not covering invest-
ment risks, i.e., resorting to a 'hostage effect'.
Second, total investment attracted by the government always falls short
of the amount H. It can be easily seen that otherwise r ≥ rH would hold,
contrary to the previous finding. Hence, the best choice of the govern-
ment is to borrow less than amount H (which would minimize damage
from a crisis) but at a lower than 'fair' interest rate.
The consequence of using the 'hostage effect' is that only investors
holding government debt will lend to the government. Indeed, it can be
easily shown that if the i-th player holds no portfolio, his payoff under
zero investment is zero, while under positive investment, it is always
negative, i.e., zero investment dominates any other decision in this case.
The same holds if the portfolio is small enough.
Our next step is to demonstrate the importance of the 'hostage effect'.
The most straightforward way to do this is to consider a simple version of
the general game, having only two participants: the government and one
investor. Suppose first that the investor holds a zero debt portfolio. One
can easily see that in this situation only two solutions are possible: 1) a
trivial solution (both suggested interest rate, and investment are zero),
and 2) the government suggests rate rH and investor lends amount H,
under which the minimum level of losses is reached: ωm = ω(H).
The cooperative solution is realized if gains from minimizing crisis
risk from ω(0) to ω(H) exceed costs of raising interest rates from
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0 to rH:
Z(ω(0)) – Z(ωm) > ϕ(rH) – ϕ(0).
The interest rate rH can be characterized then as 'fair' as it fully covers
lending risks. One can see that regardless of what type of solution is re-
alized here, the payoff of the investor is zero, while the government may
gain in the second case compared to the trivial solution. This means that
the surplus from reducing crisis risk (if it exists) in the game with one in-
vestor bearing no portfolio is fully taken by the government.
Now we can discuss the more general feasibility of cooperation between
the government and investor in crisis prevention. It makes sense to use
here a 'zero option' as a benchmark when the government refrains from
borrowing or investors decline lending. We try to find out under what
conditions the government can suggest an interest rate which makes
lending to the government attractive for an investor and the payoff of
both of them becomes, as a result, higher than in the 'zero option.'
If the cooperative solution of the game ∗ ∗( , )r x  exists, then the following
inequality holds:
r* ≥ {r0 + ω(x*) + d[ω(x*) – ω(0)]/x*}/[1 – ω(x*)] . (3)
This ensures that lending is profitable for the investor. The first two
terms on the right-hand side present just the standard requirement: the
yield on investment should cover expected losses related to the pertinent
risks. The inequality includes in addition a third term, which accounts for
the specific incentives of the debt holders to evade a failure. Taking into
account (as discussed above) that x* ≤ H, and keeping in mind that
ω(x*) > ωm, we arrive at the following limitation for r* from below:
r* ≥ [r0 + ωm + d minx ≤ H ω′(X)]/(1 – ωm) =
                                 = rH + d minx ≤ H ω′(X)/(1 – ωm). (4)
Once ω(X) is a decreasing function in the range under consideration,
debt held by investors relaxes the requirements for the yield suggested
by the government: the interest rate may lie below the 'fair' level rH
(covering lending risks), if investors are already holding public debt.
On the other hand, putting together the preferences of the government
and the investor, we can see that attracting investments makes sense for
the government only if its gain from mitigating the crisis exceeds losses
from raising the interest rate:
ϕ(r*) + Z(ω(x*)) < ϕ(0) + Z(ω(0)).
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This inequality sets an upper limit on the possible range of yields sug-
gested by the government: interest rate r* should meet condition
ϕ(r*) < ϕ(0) + Z(ω(0)) – Z(ω(H)) (5)
(the right-hand side exceeds ϕ(0), as losses are falling with investment
growth from 0 to H).
Combining relationships (4) and (5), we obtain conditions when coopera-
tion between the government and investors is impossible.
Proposition 2. If the adverse effect of raising interest rates is strong as
compared to the effect of default,
ϕ(rmin) – ϕ(0) > Z(ω(0)) – Z(ω(H)), (6)
(where rmin denotes the right-hand side of (4)), then the game has only a
trivial solution, i.e., the government cannot reduce crisis damage, sug-
gesting the investor's acceptable price for additional lending.
Indeed, it follows from (5) and (6) that
ϕ(r*) ≥ ϕ(rmin) > ϕ(0) + Z(ω(0)) – Z(ω(H)),
which according to (4) means that lending to the government is not at-
tractive for the investor. In other words, the ranges of interest rates ac-
ceptable for the government and for the investor have no intersection.
On the other hand, according to Proposition 1, the game has a positive
solution if the debt portfolio is large enough. Inequality (4) elucidates the
impact of the investor's debt holdings on the crisis development. Ac-
cording to (3), a higher debt portfolio diminishes the level of yield ac-
ceptable for the investor, and thus reduces the costs of mitigating the
crisis for the government. This becomes possible because additional in-
centives of the 'old' investors to prevent debt failure allow the govern-
ment to shift part of the costs on to these investors. We call this the
'hostage effect', as the government can use debt holdings to make in-
vestors bail out the government.
More than that, in some circumstances the 'hostage effect' can be the
only chance for the government and investors to cooperate. Indeed, if
the government does not make use of this effect in a game with one in-
vestor, it has to suggest at least a 'fair' yield rH, acceptable to the in-
vestor regardless of his debt portfolio. It may well happen though that
ϕ(rH) + Z(ω(H)) > ϕ(0) + Z(ω(0)),
and then cooperation is impossible as (5) cannot be met. At the same
time we know that if the debt portfolio is large enough, the government
can borrow, even suggesting a yield below the 'fair' level.
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The 'hostage effect' reduces investors' payoff as compared to lending at
the 'fair' yield. But, on the other hand, not only costs but also gains from
mitigating a crisis are distributed between the government and investors.
This follows from the fact (demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1)
that investors' payoff is growing with the amount of his lending in the
range from zero to the optimum amount. This means, in particular, that
using the 'hostage effect' in a situation where this is the only chance to
cooperate, the government improves both its own payoff and that of in-
vestors.
6. GAME OF INVESTORS WITH FIXED YIELD
Further discussion requires, as an interim step, an in-depth analysis of
the sub-game of investors with a given interest rate r. At the same time
this analysis contributes to understanding the properties of the model as
a whole.
We are considering below the sub-game of N investors with portfolios
(d1, ..., dN), assuming that the government has suggested some interest
rate r < rH. As a result, the focus of the analysis shifts from cooperation
between the government and investor to coordination among investors.
Still, as in the previous section, the key point of the analysis is the role of
the 'hostage effect'. Our assumption r < rH implies that the interest rate
is set taking into account this effect.
Consequently, in line with the results of the previous section, the equilib-
rium lies in the range where X < H, i.e., in the decreasing slope of func-
tion ω(X, R).
Below we investigate the 'comparative statics' of the sub-game solu-
tions.
6.1. The effect of portfolio
It was proved above that if (x1, x2, ..., xN) is a positive Nash equilibrium in
a sub-game A with interest rate r and portfolios di, investment made by
different participants are linked by the following relations:
xi + di/(1 + r) = xj + dj/(1 + r).
In other words, we obtain here rather unexpected result: though the only
incentive to invest is to save a portfolio from depreciation, within the
same positive equilibrium, the larger the portfolio, the less the invest-
ment. The reason is that the amount of investment is defined by a bal-
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ance of the direct effect (interest less possible losses from devaluation)
and the indirect effect (gain from a lower failure probability) from the unit
of additional investment. The former effect is identical for all investors,
hence the latter effect, proportional to total ('old' and 'new') assets,
should be also identical in the Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, participants with small portfolios do not come into the
game at all, having zero new investment. This is evident from comparing the
payoff function of a participant i in the arbitrary point {x*}=(x1, x2, ..., xN),
xi > 0 and in the point x0, which differs from x* only in the i-th compo-
nent, which equals zero here. Then
∗
−
0
i iw w  = [ω(X–xi) – ω (X)] di + xi {r – r0 – (1+r)ω(X)}} <
             < di[ω(X–xi) – ω(X)] + xiρ(X).
The second term is negative (as ρ(X) < rH(1 – ωm) – r0 – ωm = 0, taking
into account that we can restrict consideration with r < rH); hence, if D is
small, ∗ − 0i iw w  < 0, i.e., {x*} is not a Nash equilibrium. On the other
hand, if investment {xk}, k ≠ i is an equilibrium in the game with N – 1
participants, then x0 is also a Nash equilibrium in the initial game of N
participants.
Thus we obtain that the participant with the smallest portfolio either does
not invest at all or makes the largest investment. This is important. Next
we will estimate the impact of the portfolio on investment.
Proposition 3. The total amount of investment in the game positively
depends on the size of the portfolio held by each particular participant.
On the other hand, the amount of investment made by the i-th partici-
pant negatively depends on his own portfolio (correspondingly, invest-
ment made by other participants positively depend on the i-th portfolio).
This is proved by estimating the derivative of equilibrium investment xi
and X by di, which can be obtained by differentiating equations (1) for all
j by di. We get then
ω
ω
ω
ω
′−
= >
′− − − +
′′ ′+ −
= <
′′ ′− − − +
∑
∑
∑
/ ( ) 0,
( 1)(1 )
( 2)
/ ( ) 0.
( 1)(1 )
i
xx
xx
i i
j xx
dX d d
w N r
w N
dx d d
w N r
(7)
Applying second-order conditions, ′′xxw < 0, and keeping in mind that in
the case of negative real yield ω′ is less than 0 at the equilibrium, we
conclude that dX/d(di) > 0, dxi/d(di) < 0.
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If we restrain our consideration to symmetric games, the conclusion is
that if all portfolios grow, the investment made by all participants in-
creases.
6.2. Effect of reserves
We mentioned above that the government made efforts to increase li-
quidity by getting IMF loans. Now we can analyze the effect of these ef-
forts in terms of our model.
Speaking informally, we assumed above that the declining slope of the
'loss function' ω reflects the short-term positive effect of additional fi-
nancial resources, and increasing the slope of ω reflects the long-term
negative impact of domestic borrowing. In the short run obtaining liquid-
ity by borrowing abroad produces the same effect as borrowing domes-
tically. In the long run there may be a difference related to the terms of
these types of investment. But since we have demonstrated that the so-
lutions are restricted within range [0, rH], we can disregard this differ-
ence. We introduce thus additional game parameter R — the amount of
liquid reserves initially held by the government and assume that the latter
are full substitutes for investment. In other words, payoffs of all partici-
pants depend on ω(X + R) instead of ω(X), as in the initial definition of
the game.
The following result is surprising.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium amount of investment negatively de-
pends on the size of the government's reserves.
Indeed, by differentiating the first order conditions by R, one obtains
ω ω ω
ω ω ω
′ ′′ ′+
′ = = − − <
′ ′′ ′′ ′− − +∑
(1+r) +(D+X+Xr) (1 )
1 0,
(N+1)(1+r) +(D+X+Xr) ( 1)(1 )R j
N r
X
w N r
(8)
(where, as before, D is the total size of debt held by investors:
= ∑ iD d ).
An even stronger and more striking result holds: an increase in reserves
not only leads to a fall in total investment, but aggravates the crisis. This
is clear from analyzing the derivative of (X + R) by R, which can be ob-
tained from (8).
This means that not only the amount of investment, but also the total re-
sources held by the government are declining as reserves are growing,
i.e., the negative reaction of investors on increase of government's re-
serves exceeds the size of this increase.
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This unexpected result, which contradicts normal logic, is a consequence
of the reverse nature of coordination in our game. One can easily see
(by taking derivatives of the first-order conditions) that if the interest rate
is fixed at some level below rH and investment {x2, ..., xN} by participants
2, ..., N are fixed, then the optimal amount of lending by the first partici-
pant x1* negatively depends on any of the variables x2, ..., xN. Contrary
to the standard crises models, larger support of the status quo by one
investor creates disincentives to invest for others instead of increasing
incentives.
6.3. Number of participants
Let us analyze now the effect of changing the number of investors. We
consider two games, one (A1) with N, and another (A2) with N + 1 identi-
cal investors (holding equal portfolios), both having positive solutions. It
can be shown that if w ′ (x) is decreasing in the range of x where ω(x) is
decreasing, equilibrium investment x* negatively depends on the number
of participants. Indeed, let (x1, ..., x1), and (x2, ..., x2) be solutions in the
games A1 and A2. Then ′Nw (x1) = 0, and +′ 1Nw (x2)=0. Subtracting these
equations we obtain
[ ′Nw (x1) – ′Nw (x2)] + [ ′Nw (x2) – +′ 1Nw (x2)] =
    = [ ′Nw (x1) – ′Nw (x2)] + [ ′Nw (x2) – ′Nw (z)] –
    – (1 + r) ω′[(N + 1)x2] (z – x2) = 0,
where z = (N + 1)/N x2.
Once z > x2, both the second and the third items in the right part are
positive. Hence the first item is negative, which is to say that x1 > x2.
This leads to a conclusion presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Adding to the game A, an investor with the same portfo-
lio d leads to a decrease in investment made by each investor.
In other words, coordination is deteriorating as the number of partici-
pants is growing. Combining this conclusion with the impact of a debt
portfolio, we see that the 'hostage effect' shows itself best when the
market is dominated by a limited number of large players.
6.4. Effect of interest rate
Proposition 6. The total amount of investment in the game positively
depends on the interest rate offered by the government.
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Indeed, by differentiating the first order conditions by interest rate r, one
obtains
ω ω′− +
=
′′−
1 ( ( ) ( )]
xx
dx x x x
dr w
.
As the denominator is positive (just as it was in (7)), and the numerator
is evidently positive, we come to the conclusion that dx/dr > 0. Since the
investment of each player positively depends on interest rate r, the total
investment of all players will also positively depends on r.
7. ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL GAME
Suppose now that the game solution implies positive investment. We
consider below factors affecting the game outcome.
If game solution is positive, the maximum conditions of the first- and
second order are met at the point (r*, x*):
0( ) ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,i x i iw X r r r r X D x x r Xω ω′ ′= − − + − + + = (9)
( ) ( , ) 2(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.i xx i iw X r r X D x x r Xω ω′′ ′ ′′= − + − + + <
The left side of (9), presenting the marginal payoff of the i-th investor,
gives further insight into the nature of the 'hostage effect.' It consists of
three parts: the first term reflects notional interest revenue from lending
an additional unit (direct positive effect); the second term — losses due
to pertinent risks of this lending (direct negative effect); and the third
term — reduction of the investor's expected losses from the debt crisis
due to additional lending to the government (indirect positive effect).
Proposition 7. If the game has a positive solution, the government's
payoff is positively affected by an increase in the total portfolio size D.
Proof. Let (X*, r*) be a solution of the game.
The government's payoff is growing with X at the point (X*(r), r) under
fixed r, if X > X*(r):
V(X) > V(X*(r),r). (10)
Indeed,
V(X) – V(X*(r), r) = W(X*(r), r) – W(X, r) + Z(ω(X*(r)) – Z(ω(X)) > 0
as W(X, r) reaches it maximum by X in the point X*(r), Z is growing with
ω, and ω is decreasing by X at the solution point X*.
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Now, let D2 > D1. Taking into account Proposition 3 and relation (10),
and denoting r1 = r*(D1), r2 = r*(D2) as the optimum rates chosen by the
government given portfolio amounts D1 and D2, we obtain
V[X*(r2|D2), r2] > V[X*(r1|D2), r1],
as r2 is the optimal yield when investor has portfolio D2,
V[X*(r1|D2), r1] > V[X*(r1|D1), r1],
as, from the Proposition 3 we have X*(r1|D2) > X*(r1|D1), and then (10)
can be applied.
The impact of the portfolio on the interest rate and investment is still un-
clear: the government's payoff may increase either due to lower yield
paid to the investor or due to larger investment and hence lower the risk
of default.
The interpretation of Proposition 6 is apparent: the larger the portfolio
held by the investor, the larger will be the contribution by investors to
prevent a crisis.
The findings concerning the effect of higher reserves are more unex-
pected.
Proposition 8. If the government can gain by attracting investment, its
payoff in the game is negatively affected by an increase in the amount of
reserves R.
Proof. The proof of the Proposition 8 is similar to the proof of Proposi-
tion 7.
Let R2 > R1. Denoting r1 = r*(R1), r2 = r*(R2) as the optimum interest
rates chosen by the investor given reserves R1 and R2, and taking into
account Proposition 4, we obtain:
V[X*(r1|R1), r1] > V[X*(r2|R1), r2],
as r1 is the optimal yield when investor has portfolio R1,
V[X*(r2|R1), r2] > V[X*(r2|R2), r2] ,
as from the Proposition 4 we have X*(r2|R1) > X*(r2|R2), and then (10)
can be applied.
Again, it is unclear whether the government has to suggest a higher
yield, gets less investment, or both as a result of higher reserves.
The situation is different if initially the game solution is 'trivial'. In
this case an increase in reserves may raise incentives for the in-
vestor to participate and a positive solution may appear (the payoff
of the government then increases). In other words, the effect of
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raising government reserves may differ depending on the type of
equilibrium. If initially cooperation was missing, higher reserves may
make it possible, and the government gains from it. But if coopera-
tion was already present, an increase in reserves makes the gov-
ernment worse off.
The conclusions of our analysis are robust, as the most important of
them are based only on the most general assumptions of the model pa-
rameters (like the assumption that up to some level, the loss function
negatively depends on the amount of investment).
8. CONCLUSION
We suppose that models presented in the previous sections can contrib-
ute to understanding the 'government-investors' relationship in a course
of an acute crisis.
First, we have shown that the government can use debt held by investors
as a 'hostage' and make them incur part of the crisis costs. Second, in
the most severe situations this turns out to be the only way for the gov-
ernment (or project manager) to attract additional investment and thus to
mitigate the crisis. Third, we found that in this model, the more reserves
the government (or manager) has, the stronger is the adverse effect of
the crisis. If, according to normal logic, additional government reserves
should raise investor's confidence to the government and thus result in
cheaper borrowing, in our model quite the opposite is true: additional re-
serves lead to less bail-out efforts by investors and hence higher yields
and/or less investment.
Our game can be regarded as a model of 'mandatory cooperation' be-
tween the government and investors in crisis prevention. On the other
hand, the coordination among investors realized in the game has a re-
verse nature: the larger the lending by one investor, the less others lend.
The same effect provides additional liquidity by international financial in-
stitutions, hence a category of situations where IMF loans adversely af-
fect a crisis is identified.
We assume also that these models contribute to understanding the me-
chanics of the final stage of the Russian financial crisis (its 'end-game'),
as the facts on the development of the financial crisis in Russia show
that at some stage, the situation could correspond to the one introduced
in the game considered above. The common features of the model and
the actual situation include also:
• addressing the crisis as 'transient' by the monetary authorities;
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• investors' expectations of substantial loss in the real value of govern-
ment bonds (yields at the secondary market exceeded 100% in some
periods);
• high concentration of the GKO/OFZ market, still aggravated in the
course of the crisis;
• the outburst of the crisis in August 1998, immediately after the dis-
bursement of a large loan by international financial institutions.
Our model may shed light on the causes of the August 1998 crisis and
on receiving additional reserves from the IMF and the World Bank. Our
hypothesis is that an increase in reserves resulted in lower investment in
the GKO market; this is in line with the findings of the model.
The following policy recommendations can be derived from our analysis.
• In fighting a crisis, the government has to realize clearly in what area the
situation is. It may happen that evaluation of the risk by the government
differs from that by the investors. The former may suggest, from its
viewpoint, a fair interest rate, which the latter will accept due to the
'hostage effect' (though the latter will regard the rate as lower than
'fair'). In this case the standard measures taken by the government, like
getting an IMF loan, may have adverse effect, opposite than expected.
• If the government deliberately resorts to the 'hostage effect', it
should be fully aware of non-standard reactions to some standard
measures in this case, that is, those concerned with reverse coordi-
nation.
• It is crucial for the 'creditor of last resort' to distinguish the situation
of 'reverse coordination' from that of standard coordination, as in the
former case its loans may turn out to be harmful, thus aggravating
the crisis.
• The presence of large players may stabilize the market by making it
possible for the government to use the 'hostage effect' and reinforc-
ing the hostage effect if it is used.
While some models demonstrate how rational behavior may result in a
crisis, we give an example of a crisis fueled by actions that look rational
from the common sense viewpoint, but have the opposite effect than
what is expected.
Using the 'hostage effect' may have adverse long-term implications,
which are not reflected in our model — say, in terms of reputation. But
we may assume that the damage from default reflects the difference
between reputation damages contributed to defaulting and to using the
'hostage effect'.
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